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1 Introduction
On 17 and 18 February 2020, Rafaela Hillerbrand and Paul Grünke (both Karlsruhe Insti-
tute of Technology) from the research project “The Impact of Computer Simulations 
and Machine Learning on the Epistemic Status of LHC Data” organized the workshop 
“Machine Learning: Prediction Without Explanation?” at Karlsruhe Institute of Technol-
ogy (KIT).
The project is part of the interdisciplinary, DFG/FWF-funded research unit “The Epis-
temology of the LHC”; a unique collaboration between philosophers, physicists, historians 
and sociologists that was recently renewed for three more years.1
The workshop’s purpose was to bring together philosophers of science and scholars 
from various fields who study and employ Machine Learning (ML) techniques, in order to 
create an interdisciplinary setting for discussing the changing face of science in the light of 
ML’s constantly growing use.
Because ML is, from a certain vantage point, nothing but (statistical) optimization exe-
cuted by digital computers, one may speculate that its increased use exemplifies a para-
digmatic turn away from science’s traditional aim of explanation, and towards mere pat-
tern recognition and prediction. Moreover, it is also an open question how to explain ML’s 
exceeding utility, as witnessed by various benchmark studies in recent years.
Given this difficult epistemological status of ML, one may ponder the societal implica-
tions of its use, as well as its historical and systematic positioning as a scientific method.
Accordingly, the talks’ contents will be discussed as organized into (i) practitioners’ 
perspectives, (ii) explanations from ML, (iii) explanations of ML, (iv) societal implica-
tions, and (v) global and historical perspectives.
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2  Practitioners’ Perspectives
Among others, Jan Cermak, Uwe Ehret, and Erwin Zehe, three environmental scientists 
from KIT, were invited to take part in the workshop to share their perspectives on the use 
of ML in scientific practice. Their talk was organized into three parts, the first one present-
ing an optimistic perspective, the second a curious, sceptical one, and the third a caution-
ary, or outright pessimistic perspective.
The idea that the increased use of ML exemplifies a turn from explanation towards suc-
cessful prediction was not questioned in any of the parts. However, the importance of this 
was downplayed in the talk by Cermak, who focused on the advantages of ML in reaching 
reliable results, thus offering an optimistic outlook. One of Cermak’s main claims was that 
ML algorithms in some cases actually outperform the best physics models in environmen-
tal science, and act like a well-trained ‘sniffer dog’.
This view was countered in part by Ehret, who equally acknowledged ML methods as 
very efficient tools for data compression with a broad range of applications in science, but, 
as a partial rejoinder to Cermak’s optimistic approach, also formulated desiderata for an 
interpretable ML, such as ‘being right for the right reasons.’
Finally, Zehe, who was one of the invited speakers and chose to include his two col-
leagues for a more comprehensive perspective, defended the (pessimistic) view that addi-
tional environmental modelling will always be needed to understand the causes of climate 
phenomena. In particular, Zehe defended the view that understanding causation remains a 
global aim of science, which is not accomplished by ML.
3  Explanation from ML
The question whether it is possible to retrieve explanations from successful ML appli-
cations after all was tackled in the talks by Florian Boge (University of Wuppertal) and 
Thomas Grote (Tübingen University).
In Boge’s talk, the example of the Balmer formula and Bohr’s atom model was used as 
an analogy for the kind of gap between scientific understanding and discovery that may 
be created by the use of ML in science. In essence, Boge’s results concurred with those of 
Zehe: Just as the regularities predicted by the Balmer formula became understandable only 
against the backdrop of Bohr’s model will many ML applications require additional mod-
elling for the sake of understanding their predictions. However, in the case of ML, Boge 
argued, the gap may become far greater. These considerations were supplanted by case 
studies on ML’s black box nature from particle physics and computer science.
In a similar vein, Grote investigated the intricacies created by ML-applications in medi-
cal research. Central to Grote’s talk was a distinction between explainability and interpret-
ability, where the former notion was used to refer to the various details that are black boxed 
in an ML model, the latter to the difficulty of basing justifications on ML results.
As Grote pointed out, the demands for either strongly depend on the aims of the user: 
Whereas computer scientists, but also medical researchers, are interested in explainabil-
ity—for the sake of understanding the algorithm itself, or discovering new medical phe-
nomena, respectively—medical practitioners need only care about interpretability. Among 
other things, Grote sceptically discussed the possibility that multimodal explanations, 
which offer visualizations as well as natural language explanations, could aid in increasing 
both.
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4  Explanations of ML
The largest number of talks was devoted to explanations of ML. The first of these was 
that by Tom Sterkenburg (MCMP Munich), which established connections between 
ML research and formal epistemology. The talk’s point of departure was that, since for-
mal epistemology and ML share a common basis, when formal epistemology helps us 
understand science’s success, this may have a carry-over to understanding ML’s success.
The main connection Sterkenburg drew was between the problem of induction and 
‘no free lunch’ theorems, which in essence say that no single learning algorithm will 
perform best across all conceivable tasks. In this respect, Sterkenburg concluded that a 
lot can be learned for ML explanations from philosopher’s approaches to induction.
A similar message was carried by Timo Freiesleben’s talk (also MCMP), which dem-
onstrated the use of counterfactual explanations for explainable ML. Freiesleben dis-
cussed a formal framework from the ML literature in which the closest possible input 
is considered that would have resulted in a correct prediction – just as Lewis famously 
introduced distances between possible worlds to evaluate under what conditions some-
thing ‘would have been so and so’.
Freiesleben then suggested to relax the assumption that the output space must be 
interpretable, and to focus on the conditions under which the prediction becomes incor-
rect. This could yield an explanation of adversarial examples, wherein a small amount 
of noise is added to, say, an image, which is afterwards completely misclassified by 
neural networks.
Sergey Titov’s (St. Petersburg University) talk drew a connection between explain-
ability in ML and statistical relevance explanations. Titov especially emphasized the 
role of (homogeneous) partitions in successful statistical explanations. Explaining why 
something, x, that has attribute A also has attribute B involves finding a partition of the 
class of all As, such that x’s being in cell Ci of the partition makes a difference in prob-
ability (i.e., P(B|A) ≠ P(B|A∧Ci)).
Based on examples such as an image of a cat being recognized by means of charac-
teristic ears, nose, and mouth, but not in general by the distribution of pixels, Titov then 
suggested that statistical relevance explanations can be a good model for ML explana-
tions. This conclusion was underscored by a comparison to an explainability framework 
suggested in the ML community.
Finally, Maël Pégny (Université de Lorraine) distinguished between scientific and 
pedagogical explanations of ML algorithms. The focus of the talk was on the latter, 
which are primarily relevant for the lay public. However, Pégny hypothesized that they 
might be interesting for scientists in several ways as well.
5  Societal Implications
The invited talk by Annette Zimmermann (Princeton University) was the only one to 
focus explicitly on the societal implications of the fact that ML’s functioning is often 
hard to explain. In particular, Zimmermann dealt with the often cited right to explana-
tions in the context of ML by distinguishing explanation from justification.
In the use of opaque ML techniques for decision-making, the apparent lack of expla-
nation might lead to scepticism about the justification of the decisions in question. Her 
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proposed solution was to seriously consider that explanation may not be necessary for 
justification.
This was made plausible also with a thought experiment, coined ‘accurate Kate’: If the 
fictional character Kate happens to show a strange kind of behavior, in which she spills 
coffee on people in a cafe apparently at random, but it then turns out that she thereby accu-
rately picks out scammers, we may still demand to know why Kate does what she does, but 
her behaviour might be considered justified independently of that.
Since ML algorithms have been known to obtain such things as a racial bias through 
training, Zimmermann concluded that, in policy-making tasks and court judgements, 
justifying the use of certain algorithms would be crucial independently of their detailed 
explainability.
6  Global and Historical Perspectives
The two invited talks by Andreas Kaminski (University of Stuttgart) and Johannes Len-
hard (Technical University of Kaiserslautern) offered global perspectives on explanation 
and prediction in the context of ML. Both also used historical evidence to argue for their 
respective theses.
Kaminski, in his talk “Types of Explanation, Kinds of Reason” started from the ques-
tion what it means to trust ML models. Based on the assumption that one primarily trusts 
human beings and that this sort of trust in a non-human entity is something peculiar, he 
distinguished two types of trust: a normative or ethical one, and an epistemic one.
One intermediate result of the talk was that to trust something like a model means that 
one can understand or explain this model. With this thesis about explanation, the core 
theme of the workshop was interpreted in terms of trust: When we look for explanations in 
the context of ML, we are mainly asking for trust in the mentioned epistemic sense.
Among the most salient points was Kaminski’s discussion of Heinz von Foerster’s dis-
tinction between trivial and non-trivial machines. Non-trivial machines do not easily lead to 
explanation, understanding and prediction. There are two different kinds of opacity related 
to the trivial and non-trivial machines, respectively, Kaminski argued. A socio-technical 
opacity or, black box-ness, related to trivial machines may be lifted, whereas techno-math-
ematical opacity requires a different type of explanation. The latter often applies to ML and 
does not straightforwardly allow for simple causal explanations and understanding.
Lenhard’s talk, “The History of Mathematization and a New Culture of Prediction”, 
offered a rich historical narrative about the development of mathematical techniques for 
practical purposes, such as predicting the trajectories of cannonballs. Nicolo Tartaglia’s 
sixteenth century treatise on ballistics, La Nova Scientia, here provided a starting point, 
and Lenhard then outlined how the subsequent debate, which included contributions by 
Galileo in the seventeenth century as well as Benjamin Robins and Leonhard Euler in the 
eighteenth century, resulted in the claim that restricting mathematics to tractable forms is 
constitutive of rationality.
Another example Lenhard discussed was the problem of describing the separation of 
two components of a mixture in a distillation in thermodynamic engineering. Here, Len-
hard detected “an exploratory-iterative culture of prediction”: In order to reach better and 
better predictions, one starts from the ideal gas law, proceeds to the van der Waals equa-
tion, which acknowledges molecular details, and further to the Virial equation, which 
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provides a particularly useful form. These mathematical models are not generally tractable, 
but simulation modelling makes it possible to use them for predictive purposes.
A core problem here, however, is the presence of free parameters in such equations. 
Adjusting these results in a proliferation of variants, which constitutes ‘the dark side’ of 
simulation modelling, according to Lenhard. Taming this effect requires a balance between 
theoretical core and adjustable parameters, established in a combination of theoretical and 
practical considerations. ML methods, however, shift this balance to an extreme, Lenhard 
claimed, as they involve two important differences to simulation modelling: First, ML 
channels toward big data, thus marginalizing the theoretical elements, and second, there is 
to date a mere ‘regime’, rather than a culture, of prediction in ML.
7  Conclusion
The topic of explanation in the context of ML will certainly remain a topic of interest to 
philosophers of science in the future. Given the many advances in successful use of ML 
in science, it may even become a major topic in philosophy of science in the near future. 
What the workshop certainly established is the fact that different angles are required to 
approach surrounding questions. Not only are different perspectives on the loss of explana-
tion possible that one might face when ML delivers successful predictions, but one may 
also seek for explanations of these very predictive successes, root them in the history of 
science, or investigate their societal implications.
In sum, we may count the strong connection to questions from the history of science, or 
even to traditional philosophical problems, such as Hume’s problem of induction, among 
the main results, as established in the talks by Kaminski, Lenhard, and Sterkenburg. This 
was somewhat contrasted by Boge’s claim of a profound gap between prediction and expla-
nation, peculiar to ML applications in science, and Grote’s emphasis on explainability for 
the sake of scientific discovery. It remains an open question whether this means a problem 
for science in practice, as evidenced by the talk of Zehe, Cermak, and Ehret.
In contrast, there are the pressing issues in explaining ML’s functioning itself, and espe-
cially its failures, as addressed in the talks by Freiesleben, Sterkenburg, Titov, and Pégny. 
These are most pressing if ML is involved in policy making and political or medical deci-
sion making, as established in Zimmermann’s talk.
It may also be noted here that a special issue on the subject has been accepted for publi-
cation in Minds and Machines and is expected to appear in 2021.2 So the reader interested 
in getting a deeper view of the issues raised in this report may want to look out for this.
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